提出量子联邦学习电路级后门攻击，揭示单个恶意客户端即可严重破坏模型性能。

Quantum Federated Learning (QFL) inherits the core vulnerability of federated optimization to malicious clients, while also introducing an attack surface from variational circuit training and measurement-driven gradients. This work proposes a novel CircUit-Level backdoor Threat (CULT) model that formalizes four stealthy attacks by exploiting quantum-aware mechanisms, including Grover, Pauli, Bit-flip, and Sign-flip. By enabling malicious clients on both in-training and post-training surfaces, these attacks can critically undermine the learning process. We establish a rigorous theoretical foundation to demonstrate attack stealthiness under standard smoothness assumptions. Experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets with non-IID splits and varying fractions of malicious clients show that even a single malicious client can induce severe accuracy degradation under FedAvg aggregation. While popular defenses, including Krum, Multi-Krum, FoolsGold, FLGuardian, and Mud-HoG, reduce degradation in many regimes, they fail to eliminate worst-case failure cases, where accuracy drops up to 50\%. The experimental analysis further reveals that under the CULT model, malicious updates effectively mask their presence by staying close to benign norms, thereby helping attackers evade detection.