用遗传算法生成恶意提示,欺骗AI逆向工具误判二进制文件。
Automatically Attacking Software Reverse Engineering AI Agents
- 通过遗传算法生成隐藏指令的提示,诱导LLM误读反汇编代码。
- 在不改变程序功能前提下,使GhidraMCP等系统输出错误分析结果。
- 揭示LLM集成于安全工具链时的潜在漏洞,适合安全研究人员关注。
用于反汇编可执行二进制文件的软件工具(如Ghidra)结合大语言模型(LLM)后,可实现无需源码的静态分析自动化。基于工具的智能体系统(如GhidraMCP)进一步提升了分析师效率。然而,这种自动化也引入了新的恶意绕过风险。本文提出一种基于遗传算法的对抗性提示生成技术,改进自AutoDAN,证明其可欺骗依赖LLM的反汇编与反编译系统,使其错误解析二进制文件,导致分析结果被污染。该方法通过在提示中插入冗余字符串变量赋值,隐蔽传递指令,不影响程序实际运行。实验展示了多个简明案例。此攻击手段可能绕过依赖LLM分析流程的自动检测系统。研究有助于理解将LLM集成至网络安全工具链的安全隐患,并推动构建更鲁棒的智能代码分析系统。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Software tools for reverse engineering executable binary files, such as Ghidra, enable malware analysts to safely conduct robust static analysis without having access to original source code. Coupled with the analytic power of large language models (LLM), agentic systems enabled with tools, such as GhidraMCP, can allow analysts to automate a previously human driven process. Although this automation can increase the productivity of a single malware analyst, it also introduces a new area of vulnerability for malware obfuscation. This paper presents an adversarial technique using genetic algorithm-based prompt generation, a modification of an adversarial attack known as AutoDAN, to demonstrate the ability to deceive LLM-powered disassembly and decompilation systems into misinterpreting binary executables, effectively corrupting their analytical output. This proof-of-concept methodology exploits inherent vulnerabilities in how LLMs process and interpret decompiled machine code via prompt injection by using extraneous string variable assignments to pass surreptitious instructions to the LLM while not impacting the functionality of the executable file. We demonstrate this capability through several concise examples. This approach could enable attackers to bypass automated detection systems that rely on LLM-driven analysis pipelines. By studying and understanding this attack, insights can be gained regarding the security implication of integrating LLMs into cybersecurity toolchains and building more robust agentic code analysis systems.
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