arXiv:2606.04459cs.CRcs.AI2026-06

模型的词元排序具有唯一性,可作为不可伪造的指纹。

Token Rankings are Unforgeable Language Model Signatures

  • 用词元排序代替概率值暴露,仍能标识特定模型。
  • 足够大的k下,每个模型的前k个词元排序组合唯一。
  • 该签名难以伪造,适合用于模型身份认证场景。

语言模型参数会对其输出逻辑值施加独特的几何约束,形成可识别模型的签名,但若通过API公开逻辑值,则可能泄露最终层参数。本文研究更严格的API设计——仅暴露词元排序(按概率排序,不公开具体概率值),发现排序本身也构成签名:当k足够大时,每个模型都有唯一的可行前k个词元排序集合。此外,该排序签名是首个已知的(多项式)不可伪造签名,因为寻找具有相同可行排序集合的模型属于NP难问题。安全方面,词元排序已足以近似窃取模型最终层参数,类似逻辑值暴露;但该近似过于粗糙,无法伪造签名,且可通过限制API返回的top-k大小(较小的k)有效防御。由于揭示签名所需的top-k通常小于防止参数窃取所需的k,因此API可在不泄露参数的前提下提供不可伪造的签名。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Language model parameters are known to impose unique (to each model) geometric constraints on their logit outputs, which serves as a signature that identifies the model, but also leaks the model's final layer parameters when an API distributes logits. We investigate more restrictive APIs that expose token rankings (i.e., their ordering by probability, but not the probability values) and find that rankings also constitute a signature: every model has a unique set of feasible top-$k$ rankings for sufficiently large $k$. Furthermore, the ranking signature is the first known (polynomially) unforgeable signature, since finding a model with the same set of feasible rankings is NP-hard. On the security front, we find that token rankings are already sufficient to approximately steal the final layer of the model, similar to logits, though the approximation is too coarse to forge the signature, and can be effectively countered by restricting the API to top-$k$ tokens with sufficiently small $k$. Since the top-$k$ required to present the model signature is generally smaller than the $k$ required to prevent stealing, it is possible for an API to present an unforgeable signature without leaking model parameters.

模型指纹安全不可伪造

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