不同模型用相同方法找因果回路，结果却各不相同，说明模式选择性不等于任务因果结构。

We test whether a single screen-and-ablate recipe -- identify attention-head circuits by task-pattern selectivity, then verify by causal ablation against a matched-random null -- produces consistent mechanistic claims across model families. The recipe ports across pipelines; the specific circuit it identifies does not. Across four composed tasks (indirect-object identification, greater-than, successor sequences, variable binding) and three 1B-class language models from distinct training pipelines (Pythia 1B / Pile / dense; OLMo 1B / DCLM / dense; OLMoE 1B-7B / DCLM / mixture-of-experts), we run a unified protocol with the matched-random null sampled across ten seeds per cell. The resulting 12 (task, model) cells contain no two that share the same primary causal screen at comparable effect size: the same task, with the same behavioral capability, is implemented through different attention-pattern types across models. We introduce a five-category screen-outcome taxonomy -- primary cause, secondary cause, correlate, interferer, null -- with quantitative thresholds, and show that all five outcomes appear in the panel. We propose a falsifiable hypothesis: the MoE model in our panel builds composed-task circuits on top of a foundational previous-token positional substrate (the prev-token-circuit ablation is the strongest causal screen on 3 of 4 tasks for OLMoE 1B-7B), with the IOI exception consistent with IOI being a final-position name-copying task whose structure directly probes a different pattern. The hypothesis comes with explicit predictions for other MoE language models. We frame the methodology honestly: the spectral participation-ratio signal from the companion methodology paper is a general indicator of specialized computation; what makes a finding task-specific is the task-pattern screen plus a per-model causal verification.