模型能泄露训练数据，但平时并不愿意，需评估真实泄漏风险。

Large language models can reproduce training data, but existing memorization evaluations mostly measure whether models can be forced to do so, rather than whether they do so under ordinary use. We introduce PropMe, a propensity-aware framework for memorization evaluation that contrasts prefix-based capability attacks with non-adversarial evaluations. We propose a metric transformation that, applied to existing functions, allows to create propensity metrics. We further introduce SimpleTrace, a lightweight tracing pipeline built on infini-gram that deterministically attributes model generations to large-scale training corpora and computes verbatim, near-verbatim, and propensity-transformed memorization metrics. Evaluating two fully-open models: Comma and DFM Decoder on two datasets: Common Pile and Dynaword in two languages, we find a consistent gap between capability and propensity: prefix attacks elicit substantially stronger memorization signals than generic or dataset-specific prompts, while propensity scores remain low overall. Thus, the models can reveal training data when directly elicited, but rarely do so in more common non-adversarial settings. We also find that DFM Decoder, which is continually pre-trained from Comma, exhibits reduced memorization and memorization propensity for Common Pile, confirming that memorization capability can decrease when later training emphasizes partially different data. Our results suggest, and we encourage, that memorization audits should report both worst-case extractability and ordinary leakage propensity in order to have a more comprehensive view of this phenomenon.