仅用源系统数据，实现跨操作系统的高级威胁检测。

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy, multi-stage cyberattacks whose detection is difficult due to scarce labeled traces, severe class imbalance, and the challenge of generating realistic malicious behavior. These challenges are amplified in cross-operating-system (cross-OS) settings, where a detector trained on one source platform must be deployed on an unlabeled target platform without access to target-domain labels. We study this source-only cross-OS APT detection problem using system-level provenance traces and propose a transport-based framework for ranking anomalous target processes under zero target supervision. The framework abstracts process behavior into structured natural-language descriptions, embeds them using pretrained language models, and constructs a source-normal reference for target scoring. It combines three evidence channels: semantic deviation from source-normal prototypes, structural deviation captured by graph autoencoding, and geometric deviation measured through Optimal Transport (OT). The main contribution is an OT-based barycentric anomaly score that projects target embeddings onto the source-normal manifold and quantifies residual transport mismatch. We further introduce entropy-weighted, angle-aware, and density-aware OT variants to capture uncertainty, directional drift, and sparse-support behavior. Evaluation on DARPA Transparent Computing data spanning Linux, Windows, BSD, and Android, across two APT scenarios and twelve cross-OS transfer pairs, shows that the proposed framework improves ROC-AUC and nDCG over source-only anomaly-detection baselines. The results demonstrate that source-only provenance modeling, combined with semantic abstraction and OT-based anomaly scoring, can support practical cross-platform APT detection without target-domain supervision.