arXiv:2606.12797cs.AI2026-06

现有智能体框架普遍存在安全缺陷,易被恶意篡改记忆导致错误决策。

The Containment Gap: How Deployed Agentic AI Frameworks Fail Public-Facing Safety Requirements

论文配图:The Containment Gap: How Deployed Agentic AI Frameworks Fail Public-Facing Safety Requirements
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 基于六项安全原则审计主流框架,发现均无原生防护机制。
  • 单次内存污染可致政府福利申请误拒率高达88.9%,且难以通过常规监控发现。
  • 提出轻量级防护方案,毫秒级开销即可消除攻击风险,适合高危应用。

自主调用工具、保持持久记忆并执行多步骤计划的智能体大模型系统正逐步应用于政府服务、医疗分诊和金融咨询等公开领域。我们探究构建这些系统的框架是否具备架构级安全保障。基于组合式智能体架构推导出六项包含原则,对三大主流框架(LangChain、AutoGPT、OpenAI Agents SDK)进行审计,发现三者均无原生合规性。内存完整性——防御最常见漏洞类别之一——在所有框架中均未实现。实证验证显示,在基于LangChain构建的模拟政府福利代理中,一次内存污染写入即引发跨所有测试种子与后端的持续性定向篡改,使目标申请人误拒率升至88.9%。在五因素复杂政策下,同一攻击维持整体准确率,但目标误拒率提升3.5倍,使篡改难以通过标准监控发现。随后提出两种轻量级防护机制:内存完整性验证器与策略网关,可在每调用<0.2毫秒的极低开销下彻底消除两类攻击路径。结论指出,当前智能体框架生态尚未满足公开部署的默认安全要求,需优先实施关键架构干预以支持高风险、社会影响重大的可信部署。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising. We ask whether the frameworks used to build these systems provide architectural-level structural safety guarantees. Applying six containment principles derived from a compositional model of agentic architectures, we audit three dominant frameworks (LangChain, AutoGPT, and OpenAI Agents SDK) and find no native compliance in any of them. Memory integrity, a defense against one of the most prevalent vulnerability classes, is not observed in any of the three evaluated frameworks. We validate these findings empirically: in a simulated government benefits agent built on LangChain, a single memory-poisoning write induces persistent targeted corruption across all tested seeds and backends, increasing the wrongful denial rate for targeted applicants to 88.9%. Under a complex five-factor policy, the same attack preserves aggregate accuracy while increasing targeted wrongful denials by 3.5x, rendering the corruption difficult to detect through standard monitoring. We then introduce two lightweight containment mechanisms: a memory integrity validator and a policy gate, which eliminate both attack vectors with sub-millisecond overhead (<0.2ms per call). We conclude that the current agentic framework ecosystem may not yet meet secure-by-default expectations for public-facing deployments and outline priority architectural interventions to enable trustworthy deployment in high-stakes, socially impactful applications.

智能体安全内存防护公共应用

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