提出测试阶段逐步检测强化学习后门攻击的新方法
PolicyGuard: Towards Test-time and Step-level Adversary (Backdoor) Defense for Reinforcement Learning Agent

- 利用高斯过程后验方差计算每一步的不确定性
- 在7个游戏上平均AUC达0.856至0.859
- 无需模型参数,适合部署于真实系统
尽管强化学习(RL)在实际应用中日益普及,其安全性仍需更多关注。近期研究发现,RL代理易受后门攻击:正常情况下行为正常,但触发特定信号时执行恶意操作。现有防御方法或需访问内部参数,或仅在模型/轨迹层面有效,或局限于特定攻击类型。为此,我们提出 exttt{PolicyGuard},一种在测试阶段、逐时间步进行后门防御的方法。该方法利用高斯过程(GP)后验方差,并通过生成伪轨迹实现对每个时间步的不确定性建模。此外,我们还提供了理论依据解释 GP 后验方差的有效性。在七个 RL 游戏上的广泛实验表明,PolicyGuard 在多数情况下达到当前最优检测性能,对扰动类攻击的平均 AUROC 为 0.856,对敌手代理攻击的平均 AUROC 为 0.859。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
While real-world applications of reinforcement learning (RL) are becoming increasingly popular, the security of RL systems deserve more attention and exploration. In particular, recent work has revealed that RL agents are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where a victim agent behaves normally under standard conditions but executes malicious actions when a specific trigger is activated. Existing backdoor defenses for RL either require access to the agent's internal parameters, operate only at the model or trajectory level, or are limited to specific attack types. To ensure the security of RL agents, we propose \texttt{PolicyGuard}, a \textit{test-time step-level} backdoor defense which leverages Gaussian Process (GP) posterior variance and adapts pseudo trajectories to enable uncertainty computation for individual time step. Besides, we also provide theoretical foundations to explain the efficacy of GP posterior variance. Extensive experiments across seven RL games demonstrate that PolicyGuard achieves state-of-the-art detection performance in most cases, with average AUROC of 0.856 for perturbation-based attacks and 0.859 for adversary-agent attacks.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品;中文卡片由大模型生成,请以原文为准。