研究去中心化联盟形成中的退出与加入动态，揭示稳定结构的形成机制。
Exit-and-Join Dynamics for Decentralized Coalition Formation
- 基于局部收益评估的退出-加入决策驱动联盟演化
- 稳定状态对应无个体可获利的偏离行为
- 分析成本对稳定性的影响，适用于博弈论与组织设计
本文研究由单边退出与加入决策驱动的去中心化联盟形成过程。参与者依据阿umann-德雷兹值评估局部行动，收益仅在当前联盟内计算，而非全局协商。该模型将合作收益分配与非合作最优响应行为结合：终端划分即为不存在可获利的个体偏离的联盟结构。论文建立均衡刻画，识别动力学具有标量李雅普诺夫或精确势函数的条件，并分析切换与接受成本如何影响局部稳定性。数值实验检验了有限时间收敛性、成本敏感性及一类凸博弈基准情形。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper studies coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions. Agents evaluate local moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, so payoffs are computed within the agent's current coalition rather than through a globally negotiated coalition structure. The resulting model links cooperative payoff allocation with noncooperative best-response behavior: a terminal partition is precisely a coalition structure with no admissible, individually profitable exit-and-join deviation. We establish equilibrium characterizations, identify conditions under which the dynamics admit scalar Lyapunov or exact-potential representations, and analyze how switching and acceptance costs shape local stability. Numerical experiments test finite-time stabilization, cost sensitivity, and a special convex-game benchmark.
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