用运行平均参考策略改进双人零和博弈的自对弈收敛性。

Self-play with naive gradient ascent cycles in two-player zero-sum games: the last iterate orbits the equilibrium. Modern methods restore last-iterate convergence by regularizing toward a reference policy -- MMD a fixed one (reaching only the regularized equilibrium), R-NaD a periodic snapshot (the engine of DeepNash). We study GARIP, which anchors to the running average, and isolate what the choice of reference controls. Our central result is a mechanism: collapse tracks the peak lag of the reference, and among causal convex averages of a fixed mean lag the running average (flat profile, peak $=$ mean) uniquely minimizes that peak, while a snapshot's sawtooth has peak $= 2\times$ mean (a one-line theorem). Two consequences follow. Convergence: we prove local last-iterate convergence at constant anchor strength -- the anchor scales the base map's rotation by $1-β$, crossing the stability boundary and turning a recurrent base into a contraction (global convergence is conjectured at small $β$; we characterize a large-$β$ consensus failure). Robustness: GARIP matches R-NaD's peak performance -- on matrix games, the Coin Game, and the board games Connect Four/Othello, both moving references are far more robust than fixed-magnet and magnet-free baselines -- but is the better hyperparameter default; we report it both ways: over the full grid collapse rates are statistically indistinguishable, yet at conventional parameterizations a matched-mean-lag setting collapses in 0/40 vs 10/40 seeds (a snapshot matches it only by knowing to shorten $K$). The boundaries: an anticipatory (negative-weight) reference does better still on the stale side, and the advantage appears only where naive self-play cycles (five deep self-play loops). All experiments are pure JAX and reproducible.