用密码学证明让AI行为可验证，不依赖信任也不需重算。
Cryptographic certificates of validity for trustworthy AI
- 将AI政策转为可验证的数学命题，生成简洁证明。
- 证明可独立验证，确保动作符合预设规则。
- 适合需要可信AI治理的场景，如金融、医疗决策。
我们提出针对智能体AI系统的密码学有效性证书。核心思想是将正确性或策略条件形式化为逻辑谓词，将其编译为多项式约束上的见证验证问题，并利用简洁的密码学证明系统（可选零知识）证明该条件成立。这在源码形式化验证与密码学认证之间提供了一种折中方案。智能体的动作可附带一个独立可验证的证明，表明其满足约定的正式策略，而无需验证者信任该智能体或重新执行计算。我们从高层概述了该方法，给出核心数学转换，关联到证明携带代码、zkVM、形式化方法和智能体治理，并指出完整实现必须解决的规范、审计和部署问题。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
We propose cryptographic certificates of validity for agentic AI systems. The core idea is to formally specify a correctness or policy condition as a logical predicate, compile this predicate to a witness-checking problem over polynomial constraints, and use a succinct cryptographic proof system (and optionally zero-knowledge) to certify that the condition holds. This offers a middle ground between formal verification of source code, and cryptographic authentication. An agent's action can be accompanied by an independently checkable proof that it satisfies an agreed formal policy, without requiring the verifier to trust the agent or to re-execute computation. We outline the approach at a high level, give the core mathematical translation, relate the proposal to proof-carrying code, zkVMs, formal methods, and agent governance, and note the specification, auditing, and deployment questions that a full implementation must answer.
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