用社会决策框架分析有限选民的绝对多数判断，给出可表示性的精确条件。
The Measurable Majority
- 引入社会决策框架，定义可被多数票代表的投票集团结构。
- 证明严格多数判断的合理性准则与有限可加测度表示等价。
- 为多数决规则提供类似May定理的刻画，适合博弈论与社会科学读者。
本文通过所谓的社会决策框架（social decision frames）——即配备有特定联盟族的有限选民集合——研究有限选民中的严格多数推理。识别出一种对定性多数判断的合理性准则，并证明该准则恰好能刻画严格多数可由有限可加测度表示的条件。此外，证明了一种关于严格多数推理的最小自然逻辑是可靠且完备的。这些成果激发了对有限集合族中不一致性的组合问题的探讨；给出了部分结果并提出一个猜想。最后，将本研究结果应用于修正帕特里克·萨普斯的经典弱定性概率结构表示定理，并建立社会决策框架下普通严格多数规则的May型刻画。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority. A coherence criterion for qualitative majority judgments is identified and shown to give an exact characterization for representability of strict majorities by finitely additive measures. In addition, a minimal natural logic for reasoning about strict majorities is shown to be sound and complete. These developments motivate examination of associated combinatorial questions concerning incoherence in finite families of sets; partial results and a conjecture are given. Finally, the results of this paper are applied to correct a classical representation theorem for weak qualitative probability structures due to Patrick Suppes and to establish a May-type characterization for ordinary strict majority rule for social decision frames.
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