研究多智能体中策略性退出与加入如何影响共识形成。
Multiscale Exit-Join Dynamics: Tactical Consensus and Strategic Coalition Formation
- 构建快慢耦合模型，内聚共识与结构演化同步进行。
- 发现低退出成本反而阻碍战略共识，但促进战术一致。
- 适合研究群体决策、社交网络或组织演化的人参考。
本文提出一个多层次联盟形成模型，将策略性退出与加入决策与联盟内部的战术共识动态相耦合。联盟价值由内部信息聚合内生生成，而Aumann-Dreze收益、切换摩擦和接受规则决定战略重构。框架采用快-慢架构：可转移的联盟价值源于DeGroot式共识过程，而联盟结构通过激励驱动的退出-加入动态演化。分析刻画了战术-战略均衡、一致、分裂、极化及认知壁垒维持稳定结构的条件。建立了耦合动态的不动点表征与存在性结果。数值实验揭示‘不稳定-共识悖论’：低或负的切换障碍可能阻碍战略收敛，却同时促进时间混合，足以实现全局战术共识。研究为多智能体系统中的联盟形成、共识动态、信息聚合与战略稳定性提供了统一视角。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
This paper develops a multiscale model of coalition formation in which strategic exit-and-join decisions are coupled with tactical consensus dynamics inside coalitions. Coalition value is generated endogenously from within-coalition information aggregation, while Aumann-Dreze payoffs, switching frictions, and acceptance rules govern strategic reconfiguration. The framework introduces a fast-slow architecture in which transferable coalition value emerges from DeGroot-style consensus processes, while coalition structures evolve through incentive-driven exit-and-join dynamics. The analysis characterizes joint tactical-strategic equilibria, conditions for tactical and strategic unanimity, segregation, polarization, and cognitive barriers that sustain stable coalition structures. A fixed-point characterization and existence results are established for the coupled dynamics. Numerical experiments reveal an instability-consensus paradox: low or negative switching barriers may prevent strategic convergence while simultaneously promoting temporal mixing sufficient to achieve global tactical consensus. The results provide a unified perspective on coalition formation, consensus dynamics, information aggregation, and strategic stability in multi-agent systems.
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