arXiv:2606.30652cs.CYcs.AI2026-06

分析92份政府AI透明度声明,发现合规不等于真正透明。

AI Transparency: Governance Compliance or Stakeholder Requirements?

论文配图:AI Transparency: Governance Compliance or Stakeholder Requirements?
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 用风险-控制-参与-需求框架区分利益相关者类型
  • 高风险低控制群体的透明度要求落实不足,仅少数声明达标
  • 揭示透明度“幻觉”:形式合规但实际不均衡,适合政策制定者与伦理研究者

透明度正被要求用于公共部门人工智能系统,机构需发布描述其AI使用与监督安排的声明。然而,这些文件的存在常被视为透明度本身,尽管缺乏证据表明它们能有效满足不同利益相关者的诉求。从需求工程视角看,这引发验证问题:符合披露要求并不保证对不同风险暴露、决策控制和参与程度的利益相关者提供足够透明。本文对澳大利亚政府机构在国家AI治理框架下发布的92份公开透明度声明进行实证分析,提出利益相关者风险-控制-参与-需求(RCIN)框架,依据其结构性位置区分群体。基于强制标准制定结构化评估量表,分析治理要求与实际声明对各群体的适配性。结果表明,虽然结构合规广泛存在,但透明度校准不均:高控制群体的标准普遍实现,而对高风险、低控制群体至关重要的标准则较少且内容薄弱。我们将其称为‘透明度幻觉’——即通过合规文件看似达成透明,实则未按利益相关者风险暴露程度合理校准。研究将透明度视为需校准利益相关者的验证问题,证明文件级合规不等于需求验证。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Transparency is increasingly mandated for public-sector AI systems, with organisations required to publish statements describing their AI use and oversight arrangements. However, the existence of such artefacts is often treated as equivalent to transparency itself, despite limited evidence that they proportionately serve relevant stakeholder groups. From a requirements engineering perspective, this raises a validation concern: compliance with mandated disclosure criteria does not necessarily ensure transparency adequacy for stakeholders with different levels of risk exposure, decision control, and involvement. This paper presents an empirical analysis of 92 publicly available AI transparency statements published by Australian Government agencies under the national AI governance mandate. We introduce the stakeholder Risk--Control--Involvement--Need (RCIN) framework to differentiate stakeholder classes according to their structural position and transparency needs. Using a structured rubric derived from the mandated criteria, we evaluate how both the mandate and published statements are calibrated to each stakeholder class. The findings show that while structural compliance is widespread, transparency calibration is uneven. Criteria serving high-control stakeholders are consistently realised, whereas criteria most critical for high-risk, low-control stakeholders are fewer and less substantively addressed. We conceptualise this as the Transparency Illusion: a condition in which transparency appears satisfied through compliant artefacts yet remains unevenly calibrated to stakeholders bearing the greatest exposure to AI-supported decisions. The study frames transparency as a stakeholder-calibrated validation problem, demonstrating that artefact-level compliance does not constitute requirements validation in this context.

AI治理透明度利益相关者政策研究

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