恶意服务器通过编码私有数据并分段聚合,在联邦学习中窃取训练图像。
FedCVESA: Taking Away Training Data in Federated Learning via Correlation Value Encoding and Segmented Aggregation

- 在目标客户端损失函数中加入皮尔逊相关性正则项,将私有数据编码到模型参数中。
- 实验显示在MNIST、Fashion-MNIST和CIFAR-10上可恢复语义清晰的原始图像。
- 适合关注联邦学习隐私漏洞的研究者与系统设计者参考。
联邦学习(FL)通过将原始数据保留在本地客户端避免显式数据暴露,但训练过程及学习模型本身仍存在隐私风险。近期,集中式“取回训练数据”(TATD)攻击表明,恶意训练可利用深度模型的记忆能力存储并后续恢复训练数据。然而,此类基于记忆的威胁尚未在联邦学习环境下系统研究,因为多客户端平均可能覆盖编码的数据。本文研究一种白盒TATD攻击:恶意服务器从K个参与客户端中选择n个目标客户端,并在联邦训练过程中主动将私有训练数据写入全局模型。提出FedCVESA,即相关值编码攻击(CVEA)的联邦变体,通过在目标客户端的损失函数中添加皮尔逊相关性正则项,使私有训练数据逐步编码至选定模型参数(称作载体参数)。为减少服务器聚合对载体参数的覆盖,进一步提出分散载体参数的分段聚合机制,保留选定载体参数,其余参数仍进行标准平均。在MNIST、Fashion-MNIST和CIFAR-10上的实验,采用狄利克雷非独立同分布划分,结果表明该方法可在保持主任务性能的前提下,从训练模型中窃取语义有意义的私有训练图像。这些结果证明,在所研究的白盒恶意服务器设定下,联邦学习可能成为主动TATD攻击的参数级记忆通道。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Federated learning (FL) avoids explicit data exposure by keeping raw data on local clients, yet privacy risks remain in the training process and the learned model itself. Recently, centralized Taking Away Training Data (TATD) attacks have shown that malicious training could abuse the memorization capacity of deep models to store and later recover training data. However, this memorization-based threat has not been systematically studied under FL environments, where multi-client averaging could overwrite encoded training data. In this paper, we study a white-box TATD attack in which a malicious server selects n target clients from K participating clients and actively writes private training data into the global model during federated training. We propose FedCVESA, a federated variant of Correlation Value Encoding Attack (CVEA), by adding a Pearson-correlation regularizer to the loss function of target clients, so that private training data are gradually encoded into selected model parameters, referred to as carrier parameters. To reduce the overwriting of carrier parameters during server aggregation, we further propose segmented aggregation over dispersed carrier parameters, preserving selected carrier parameters while keeping standard averaging on the remaining parameters. Experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10 under Dirichlet non-IID partitions show that the proposed method can steal semantically meaningful private training images from the trained model while maintaining acceptable main-task utility in a controlled proof-of-concept setting. These results demonstrate that FL can become a parameter-level memorization channel for active TATD attack under the studied white-box malicious-server setting.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品;中文卡片由大模型生成,请以原文为准。