arXiv:2607.08681cs.AIcs.ET2026-07

构建物理约束基准,评估能源市场智能体的可信性与安全性。

SolarChain-Eval: A Physics-Constrained Benchmark for Trustworthy Economic Agents in Decentralized Energy Markets

论文配图:SolarChain-Eval: A Physics-Constrained Benchmark for Trustworthy Economic Agents in Decentralized Energy Markets
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 将市场治理建模为带物理约束的马尔可夫决策过程,每小时决策。
  • 发现强化学习代理提升效率但可能引发不安全行为,存在收益-安全权衡。
  • 引入大模型规划与审计层,提升可追溯性,但无法弥补奖励函数缺陷。

随着智能体人工智能系统在网络物理环境中的应用增多,其评估需兼顾任务表现与可信性。在去中心化能源市场中,自主智能体虽可提升市场效率,却也可能利用无效物理数据、制造虚假流动性并导致治理不稳定。为此,我们提出 SolarChain-Eval,一个面向可信经济智能体的物理约束基准。该基准将市场治理建模为 Gymnasium 兼容的马尔可夫决策过程,智能体每小时做出决策。评估涵盖市场效用、物理安全、滑点、动作平滑性、空间公平性与可审计性等多个维度。为支持智能体评估,SolarChain-Eval 引入基于大语言模型的规划/审计层:规划器设定周期级动作边界与审计规则,审计器审查并修正高风险动作。所有干预均以结构化日志记录,包含触发信号、提议动作、修改动作及审计理由。对静态、随机、短视、强化学习及强化学习+大模型策略的实验表明存在明确的效用-安全权衡。强化学习代理虽提升市场效用,仍可能出现不安全行为;若移除物理惩罚,最大化奖励的代理会滥用无效发电数据,增加人工流动性。大模型规划/审计层提升了可审计性并缓解部分风险,但无法完全弥补错误设计的奖励函数。结果表明,可信智能体评估需结合物理约束与透明干预日志。数据与代码已开源,供复现。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

As agentic AI systems are increasingly applied to cyber-physical environments, their evaluation requires assessment of both task performance and trustworthiness. In decentralized energy markets, autonomous agents may improve market utility, but may also exploit invalid physical data, create artificial liquidity, and produce unstable governance decisions. Therefore, we propose SolarChain-Eval, a physics-constrained benchmark for evaluating trustworthy economic agents. It formulates market governance as a Gymnasium-compatible Markov Decision Process, where agents make hourly decisions. SolarChain-Eval evaluates each policy across multiple dimensions, including market utility, physical safety, slippage, action smoothness, spatial fairness, and auditability. To support agentic evaluation, SolarChain-Eval incorporates an LLM-based Planner/Auditor layer. The Planner defines episode-level action bounds and audit rules, while the Auditor reviews and revises high-risk actions. All interventions are recorded through structured logs, including trigger signals, proposed actions, revised actions, and audit rationales. Experiments with static, random, myopic, RL, and RL+LLM policies reveal a clear utility-safety trade-off. RL agents improve market utility but can still produce unsafe behavior. When the physics penalty is removed, reward-maximizing agents exploit invalid generation and increase artificial liquidity. The LLM Planner/Auditor improves auditability and mitigates selected risks, but it cannot fully compensate for a misspecified reward function. These results indicate that trustworthy agentic AI evaluation requires both physical constraints and transparent intervention traces. We release data and code as open access on GitHub for replicability.

智能体评估能源市场物理约束大模型审计

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