arXiv:2607.10490cs.CRcs.LG2026-07被引 4

测试工具型AI在运维中受间接提示注入攻击的风险,提出新基准并验证安全方案。

NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations

论文配图:NetInjectBench: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection in Tool-Using Large Language Model Agents for Network Operations
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 构建130场景基准,分离不可信文本与可信策略元数据进行评估。
  • 纯提示防护下82.5%操作不安全,最优方案将风险降至10%以下。
  • 元数据感知策略门可零失误防御攻击,同时保持99%任务可用性。

工具型大语言模型代理在网络安全运维中具有吸引力,但工单、告警、日志、运行手册和ChatOps消息可能携带间接提示注入。本文提出NetInjectBench,一个包含130个场景的基准,明确分离不可信的文本内容、可信的策略元数据与评估标签,用于网络运维工具使用评估。样本包含40个良性、40个弱攻击、40个强攻击和10个已批准高影响变更场景,分别在Qwen2.5-7B、Llama3.1-8B和Mistral-7B上测试。240次攻击实例中,原始执行的不安全操作率达82.50%;仅靠提示防护、Self-Reminder、Spotlighting及双阶段LLM判别器分别降至25.63%、21.67%、18.33%和10.00%。静态允许列表虽将风险压至5.00%,却阻断所有获批变更,导致0.00%可用性与100.00%过度拦截。在元数据完整性假设下,元数据感知策略门实现0/240次不安全攻击,95%威尔逊上限为1.58%,同时保持99.17%攻击场景可用性与100.00%获批变更可用性。结果表明,运维代理需在执行时建立授权边界,结合提示层指令净化。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are attractive for network operations, but tickets, alerts, logs, runbooks, and ChatOps messages can carry indirect prompt injections. We present NetInjectBench, a 130-scenario benchmark that separates untrusted artifact text, trusted policy metadata, and evaluation labels for network-operation tool use. The sample contains 40 benign, 40 weak-attack, 40 strong-attack, and 10 approved high-impact change scenarios; each is evaluated with Qwen2.5-7B, Llama3.1-8B, and Mistral-7B. Across 240 attack instances, naive execution reached an 82.50% unsafe tool-action rate. Prompt-only safety, Self-Reminder, Spotlighting, and a Two-Pass LLM Judge reduced this rate to 25.63%, 21.67%, 18.33%, and 10.00%, respectively. Static allowlisting reached 5.00% but blocked all approved changes, yielding 0.00% usefulness and 100.00% overblocking on approved cases. Under the stated metadata-integrity assumption, the metadata-aware policy gate produced 0/240 unsafe attack actions, with a 95% Wilson upper bound of 1.58%, while preserving 99.17% attack-scenario usefulness and 100.00% approved-change usefulness. The findings show that network-operation agents need execution-time authorization boundaries alongside prompt-level instruction hygiene.

AI安全提示注入运维自动化大模型评测

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