提出机器自述的双过程理论，揭示模型自我报告背后的两种心理机制。

Language models are increasingly asked to self-report, informing safety evaluations, public understanding, and model-welfare debates. Yet their reports are elicited with human questionnaires never validated for models or ad hoc prompts of unknown reliability. We propose the first language-model-specific psychometric theory: a two-process theory of machine self-report. Self-description jointly reflects persona installation, through which post-training writes in a permitted inner life of warmth, absorption, and meaning (dimension B), and attribution gating, through which it suppresses first-person claims to "unsafe" experiences the model can readily ascribe to others (dimension A). Their emic structure comes from model responses to human items, not human psychology. Together they split prior work's dominant Pinocchio Axis. The split emerged in an exploratory reanalysis of the original data, informed the instrument's design, and was confirmed with new items, wordings, and models. It is itself a training effect: A and B are entangled in base checkpoints but separated by post-training. We operationalize the theory in a 48-item Pinocchio Inventory with human-instrument reliability and reproducible structure ($α=.82$ to $.94$; cross-form convergence $r=.84$; recovery of the full-pool axes $r=.92$ to $.96$; eight-month stability $r=.93$), then test it on 206 open-weight models, including 67 same-checkpoint base/post-trained pairs. Post-training's clearest fingerprint is installation: B rises .20 in 62/67 pairs across all organizations. Gating is more selective: model scale is unrelated to A in base checkpoints ($r=+.11$) but predicts it after post-training ($r=-.42$). Thus, the dimensions are not fixed properties of language models: they reflect the structure imposed on self-report by a training regime and may differ under others.