为避免目标混淆，提出反目标推理新框架
Anti-Goal Reasoning: Rethinking the Theory of Goal Reasoning in Non-Axiomatic Logic
- 区分目标与反目标，避免避害被误作追求否定事件
- 引入防止操作符，实现主动预防与被动回避的区分
- 四组案例验证框架可清晰分辨四种行为类型
非公理逻辑（NAL）中的目标推理解释了智能系统在知识和资源不足时如何推导实现期望事件的手段。然而，回避行为的表达仍不清晰。通常将‘避免G’记为‘¬G!’，但该记法混淆了两种含义：追求¬G事件，或回避G事件。本文指出这种混淆可能导致悖论——仅因行动常伴随无伤害，本意为回避的意图反而被转化为积极行动目标。基于NAL的目标定义，论文扩展出反目标的正式定义，使回避可独立表达而不等同于对否定事件的追求。最后引入心理操作符$ op{prevent}$，连接反目标推理与普通目标推理，用于主动预防场景。四个最小案例验证新规则能有效区分追求、被动回避、主动预防及为保全期望事件而停止行动这四种行为。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Goal reasoning in Non-Axiomatic Logic (NAL) explains how an adaptive system derives means for realizing desired events under insufficient knowledge and resources. However, the representation of avoidance is less clear. A common convention is to express ``avoid $G$'' as the goal sentence ``$\neg G!$'', but this notation conflates two different readings: pursuing the negated event $\neg G$, and avoiding the positive event $G$. This paper shows that the conflation can produce a paradoxical case in which an avoidance intention is converted into a positive goal to act merely because acting is usually followed by the absence of hurt. Starting from NAL's basic definition of goals, the framework is extended with a corresponding definition of anti-goals, so that avoidance can be represented without treating it as the pursuit of a negated event. Finally, a mental operation, $\op{prevent}$, is introduced to connect anti-goal reasoning with ordinary goal reasoning in cases of active prevention. Four minimal case studies check that the resulting rules distinguish pursuit, passive avoidance, active prevention, and withholding action to preserve a desired event.
Thank you to arXiv for use of its open access interoperability. PaperDance 不是 arXiv 官方产品；中文卡片由大模型生成，请以原文为准。