实验发现：落后焦虑比风险偏好更促使AI研发冒进。

Technological races create tension between speed and safety: actors may gain by moving faster than competitors, even when risky development is harmful. This is prominent in debates about artificial intelligence (AI), where competitive pressure is often argued to incentivise riskier, less safety-conscious development. We study this using a framed behavioural experiment based on an idealised AI race, in which paired participants repeatedly chose between Safe and Unsafe development under an uncertain time horizon. Unsafe development gave faster progress and higher immediate payoffs but accumulated private risk up to a treatment-specific maximum of 10\%, 60\%, or 90\%; the race's competitive structure was held constant, and only this maximum risk varied. Neither the pre-registered comparison between risk levels nor the role of elicited risk preferences was supported by the data. Instead, exploratory analyses motivated by the task's repeated structure show that Unsafe behaviour is shaped less by risk preferences than by the evolving strategic state of the race: participants are more likely to choose Unsafe after their opponent does so, being ahead reduces Unsafe play while falling behind increases it, and first-round choices predict later behaviour. To interpret these effects we introduce a reduced evolutionary model with four strategies -- Always Safe, Always Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, and Conditionally Antisocial Safe -- which reproduces the treatment effect and shows how conditional Unsafe behaviour can be favoured by competitive race dynamics. Together, the experiment and model show that unsafe development can emerge from early behavioural momentum, opponent behaviour, and fear of falling behind, rather than from risk preferences alone, suggesting policy should focus on reducing competitive pressure and promoting cooperation in AI development rather than only individual risk.