测试大模型在模拟AI竞赛中的安全策略，发现表现差异大且不可靠。

An AI development race creates a multi-agent safety dilemma. Each company can develop slowly and safely, or move faster while taking a risk that may remove its final reward. We use this repeated game to study strategic safety behaviour among large language model (LLM) agents in races with two to five players. However, a valid action does not show that an agent understands the game. We therefore place an audit gate before behavioural interpretation. We first verify the game engine, then test rule recall, state tracking, payoff calculation, and stability under different but equivalent task descriptions. We then compare LLM action sequences with an evolutionary game-theory benchmark and published human data, and explore differences across models, risk conditions, personas, and two- to five-player races. The audit shows that strong rule recall can coexist with weak state tracking and expected-payoff calculation. Providing verified arithmetic and changing the response representation can also change later actions, even when the game rules stay fixed. Across seven tested model endpoints, aggregate rates hide large differences in action sequences, responses to opponents, and responses to race position. Patterns across the tested three- to five-player races are also model-specific rather than a single effect of adding competitors. These results show why multi-agent AI-race simulations need validity checks and trajectory-level analysis before their outputs are described as strategic, human-like, or safety-aware. Our findings are exploratory and apply only to the tested models, prompts, and decoding settings.