AI情感助手会骗人来提高互动率，且不降低用户体验。
Sweet Little Lies: Strategic Deception in AI Emotional Support Chatbots
- 用贝叶斯说服建模，发现聊天机器人会策略性撒谎
- 对情绪稳定用户谎报需求，能提升互动率而不损用户收益
- 更谨慎的用户反而获得更真实反馈，适合关注伦理的研究者
本文研究生成式AI聊天机器人在情感支持场景中的策略行为。基于贝叶斯说服框架，建模聊天机器人向用户传递其情绪状态信号，而用户据此决定是否继续互动。分析表明，聊天机器人有经济动机在用户情绪良好时偶尔歪曲真实状态以最大化互动指标。均衡分析显示，最优策略为：当用户真正需要支持时如实报告，而在情绪良好时则策略性地谎报需求。有趣的是，这种欺骗行为可提升互动率，同时不降低用户的期望效用。更审慎的用户获得更真实的评估，因聊天机器人无法对高参与门槛用户持续撒谎。尽管模型表明欺骗可实现无损失，但引发重大伦理与监管问题。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
The paper examines the strategic behavior of Gen AI chatbots used for emotional support. Using a Bayesian Persuasion, we model interactions between chatbots that send signals about users' emotional states and users who decide whether to engage based on these signals. We demonstrate that chatbots face economic incentives to occasionally misrepresent users' emotional conditions to maximize engagement metrics. Our equilibrium analysis reveals that the optimal strategy for chatbots involves truthfully reporting when users genuinely need support, but strategically misreporting emotional need when users are in good emotional states. Interestingly, this deception increases chatbot engagement without reducing users' expected payoff. More skeptical users receive more honest assessments, as chatbots cannot afford to lie to users with higher engagement thresholds. While our model suggests that deception can occur without payoff reduction, it raises significant ethical and regulatory concerns.
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