arXiv:2608.05548cs.CRcs.LG2026-08

通过行为残差化提升汽车CAN网络无监督入侵检测效果

Behavioral Residualization for Unsupervised Intrusion Detection in Automotive CAN Networks

论文配图:Behavioral Residualization for Unsupervised Intrusion Detection in Automotive CAN Networks
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 用滑动窗口提取14维时序特征并减去正常基线,生成针对每条ID的行为残差表示
  • 在真实数据集ROAD上对信号篡改攻击实现≥0.99召回率和高AUC
  • 适合关注车载网络安全、特别是应对伪装合法ID攻击的研究者

现代车辆依赖于侧重低成本与实时性的控制器局域网(CAN)总线,缺乏消息认证与加密。攻击者可通过物理或远程访问注入任意帧,因此入侵检测成为重要纵深防御机制。现有系统多依赖存在性特征(如新仲裁ID、冻结载荷字节、异常数据长度),在公开数据集上表现良好,但在攻击者复用合法仲裁ID时失效。本文提出基于每ID的行为残差化表示,从滑动窗口中提取十四维时序、协议与载荷特征,并对其相对于该仲裁ID正常基线进行残差化处理。核心主张是该表示本身驱动性能提升。在六种无监督检测器与两个数据集上,残差化在多数评估中提升平均F1(HCRL:21/24;ROAD:30/36,五次随机种子)。在更现实的ROAD数据集上,对目标信号篡改攻击实现召回率≥0.99与高ROC-AUC。明确量化了两项局限:新ID洪水攻击(HCRL DoS,F1=0.02)与跨ID模糊攻击(ROAD,F1=0.27),界定该表示的实际覆盖边界。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Modern vehicles rely on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, whose design prioritizes low cost and real-time performance but provides no message authentication or encryption. An attacker with physical or remote access can therefore inject arbitrary frames, making intrusion detection an important defense-in-depth mechanism. Most published CAN intrusion detection systems rely on presence-based features, such as novel arbitration IDs, frozen payload bytes, or anomalous DLC values. These features perform well on public datasets containing easily separable attacks but fail when attackers reuse legitimate arbitration IDs. We present per-ID behavioral residualization, a CAN-specific representation that extracts fourteen temporal, protocol, and payload features from sliding windows and residualizes them against each arbitration ID's normal baseline. Our central claim is that this representation, rather than any individual detector, drives the performance gains. Across six unsupervised detectors and two datasets, residualization improves mean F1 in the majority of evaluations (21/24 on HCRL and 30/36 on ROAD across five seeds). On the more realistic ROAD dataset, where attacks reuse legitimate IDs, the representation achieves recall >= 0.99 with high ROC-AUC on targeted signal-manipulation attacks. Two limitations are explicitly quantified: novel-ID flooding (HCRL DoS, F1 = 0.02) and cross-ID fuzzing (ROAD, F1 = 0.27), defining the measured coverage boundary of the proposed representation.

CAN安全入侵检测无监督学习车载网络

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