发现无人机群组的定位盲区,提出可恢复绝对位置的防御方法。
Rigid-Covert GNSS Spoofing of UAV Swarms: A Structural Blind Spot, Its Detection Limit, and Absolute-Anchor Defenses

- 利用相对距离不变性设计隐蔽欺骗攻击,突破传统检测机制。
- 在10.1米漂移下仍能将非锚点无人机定位误差控制在0.39米以内。
- 适用于无物理硬件验证的仿真环境,适合安全防御研究者参考。
协同无人机群组常通过交叉验证各机间几何关系来检测GNSS异常。本文揭示该相对几何通道存在结构性盲区:一种缓慢变化的全局平移(刚性隐蔽偏移,RigidShift)会保持所有相对距离不变,因此无法被仅依赖相对信息的检测器识别(符合规范自由度原理)。我们在距离验证与半定可行性基线中验证了此盲区,明确区分其与机载惯性/GNSS监测器的差异——后者虽能报警但无法恢复真实位置。为量化外部参考恢复可观测性的条件,我们推导出校准锚点残差检测器的漂移相关检测下限 $2γ/(1-t_s/T)$,并实证发现额外的检测器特异性噪声下限(实测斜率2.66,预测值2.67)。随后提出集中式锚点根植恢复流程:基于机间距离重建群组几何,采用鲁棒拟合对齐可信锚点子集,恢复非锚点无人机的绝对位置。分段估计器联合估计锚点漂移、攻击速率及起始时间,无需干净时段标签。在统计模拟、ArduPilot软件闭环实验及含渲染视觉锚点的Gazebo仿真中,方法在约10.1米GNSS漂移下将非锚点无人机定位误差中位数降至0.39米(20次种子),在渲染视觉多SITL场景中达7.1厘米(5次种子)。同时分析了非共线锚点布局、覆盖范围、τ→0漂移攻击混叠及多数锚点被攻陷等限制条件。所有评估均为仿真,未使用射频欺骗硬件或实体无人机群。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Cooperative UAV-swarm defenses commonly cross-check GNSS positions against measured inter-drone geometry. We show that this relative-geometry channel has a structural blind spot: a common, slowly varying translation (a rigid-covert shift, RigidShift) preserves all pairwise distances and is therefore unobservable to any relative-only detector (a gauge-freedom argument). We validate this blindness on distance-verification and semidefinite-feasibility baselines, while explicitly distinguishing it from onboard inertial/GNSS monitors that can raise a bare alarm but cannot recover the swarm's true position. To quantify when an external reference restores observability, we derive the drift-dependent detection floor $2γ/(1-t_s/T)$ for a calibrated anchor-residual detector and empirically identify an additional detector-specific noise floor (measured slope 2.66 vs. predicted 2.67). We then present a centralized anchor-rooted recovery pipeline that reconstructs swarm geometry from inter-drone ranges, aligns it to a trusted-anchor subset with Byzantine-robust fitting, and recovers the absolute positions of non-anchored drones. A segmented estimator jointly estimates anchor drift, attack rate, and onset when no clean-epoch label is available. Across statistical simulations, ArduPilot software-in-the-loop experiments, and Gazebo experiments with rendered vision anchors, the method recovers the positions of non-anchored drones to a median error of 0.39 m (20 seeds) under approximately 10.1 m of GNSS drift, and to 7.1 cm (5 seeds) in the rendered-vision multi-SITL setting. We also characterize the explicit limits imposed by non-collinear anchor geometry, anchor coverage, $τ\to0$ drift-attack aliasing, and majority anchor compromise. All evaluations are simulation-based and use no RF spoofing hardware or physical swarm.
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