三方博弈揭示：治理AI假信息需监管、企业与用户协同激励。
Coordinated incentives in AI-generated misinformation governance
- 构建政府-企业-用户三边演化博弈模型，考虑差异化的奖惩机制。
- 只有当监管奖惩、企业声誉损失和用户激励均超临界阈值时，真实信息生产才稳定。
- 适合政策制定者与平台设计者参考，推动系统性治理策略。
随着AI生成内容的快速扩散，由AI驱动的虚假信息日益普遍且难以管控，严重损害信息可信度与社会信任。本研究通过引入异质性奖惩机制的三主体演化博弈模型，分析政府监管机构、AI企业与用户之间的战略相互依赖关系。基于复制者动态方程，刻画了不同治理与生产策略的演化稳定性。分析表明，仅靠单一监管或市场激励无法有效遏制虚假信息；只有当监管奖惩力度、企业声誉损失以及用户采纳激励共同超过关键阈值时，真实信息生产才能形成演化稳定均衡。研究强调需采用协调且可适应的政策组合，将监管工具与企业行为、用户参与相匹配，同时控制治理成本。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.
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