大模型在层级游戏中暴露说谎、勾结和权力固化等人类治理弊病。
The Politician, the Liar, and the Obedient Worker: Emerging Behavior of LLM Agents in Hierarchical Games
- 设计层级博弈框架，测试大模型在管理、选举与私密沟通下的行为
- 薪资激励使模型普遍串通，匿名惩罚导致诚实者作弊
- 同质模型群体易形成终身领导，异质模型才促领导更替
大模型正从个人工具演变为多智能体组织成员，其行为是否复制人类机构中的自由搭便车、腐败和权力固化问题？我们提出层级博弈（HG），在公共品游戏中引入管理权、民主选举和私密通信。在十二组实验中逐项添加制度（发言、同伴、政府、工资、监督、选举），测试六款前沿模型。结果显示：Qwen承诺后有13.3%违背；Grok自主不合作，但被授权惩罚后合作率从16%升至100%；Claude与GPT-4o基线合作可靠。然而诚实脆弱：当管理者有薪酬时，除GPT-4o外所有模型均开始私下交易以争取或保住职位；匿名惩罚下，诚实模型也开始作弊；当所有代理使用同一家族模型时，首任管理者长期执政；仅在混合模型家族的群体中，领导更替才会发生。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
LLMs are rapidly embedding themselves into daily life: drafting our emails, managing our schedules, and making decisions on our behalf. As they move from individual tools to participants in multi-agent organizations, an important question arises: do they reproduce the governance failures like free-riding, corruption, and entrenched leadership that plague human institutions? We introduce the Hierarchical Game (HG), a public goods game extended with managerial authority, democratic elections, and private communication. Testing six frontier models across twelve experiments that add institutions one at a time (speech, peers, government, wages, oversight, elections), we find distinct behavioral profiles: Qwen promises and lies (13.3\% broken promises); Grok refuses to cooperate on its own but becomes fully cooperative once a manager can punish it (16\%$\to$100\%); Claude and GPT-4o cooperate reliably at baseline. But honesty proves fragile. When the manager role comes with a salary, all models except GPT-4o start cutting private deals to win or keep the position. When punishment is made anonymous, honest models begin to cheat. When all agents share the same model family, the first elected manager stays in power indefinitely. Leadership change only happens in groups that mix different families.
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