让博弈双方公开策略文本，发现有条件合作更胜一筹。
The Open-Strategy Dictator Game: Cooperation Under Mutual Transparency
- 玩家用自然语言公开策略，决策受对方策略影响
- 条件性合作策略在多种参数下均占优
- 适合研究可解释决策与合作机制的学者
我们提出开放策略独裁者博弈（OSDG），一种经典独裁者博弈的变体，其中每位玩家的策略是全体参与者可见的自然语言文档。独裁者的分配决定（分享或拿走）可基于受赠者策略文本的内容。大语言模型通过结合受赠者策略上下文来解读独裁者策略。我们在多样策略间进行循环赛，利用Softmax均衡频率、优势分析及对合作价值敏感度评估结果矩阵。结果显示，条件性合作策略（对合作者分享、对剥削者索取）始终占优，而无条件策略（始终分享或始终索取）则弱占优。结果表明，在可检视彼此决策过程的环境中，条件性合作在广泛收益参数范围内具有进化稳健性。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
We introduce the Open-Strategy Dictator Game (OSDG), a variant of the classic dictator game in which each player's strategy is a natural-language document visible to all participants. The dictator's decision, to SHARE or TAKE an endowment, may depend on the text of the recipient's strategy. A large language model adjudicates each interaction by interpreting the dictator's strategy in the context of the recipient's. We run round-robin tournaments among diverse strategies and analyze the resulting payoff matrix using softmax equilibrium frequencies, dominance analysis, and sensitivity to the relative value of cooperation. Conditionally cooperative strategies, those that share with cooperators and take from exploiters, consistently dominate, while unconditional strategies (always share or always take) are weakly dominated. The results suggest that in environments where agents can inspect each other's decision procedures, conditional cooperation is evolutionarily robust across a wide range of payoff parameters.
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