评估大模型数学能力需区分多种创造机制，而非仅看答题对错。

How should we assess whether large language models can perform mathematical invention? I argue that this question is currently underspecified: mathematical creativity is not one capacity but several mechanistically distinct modes of meaning-making - reflexive introspection on mathematical practice, analogical import from the sciences, problem-driven construction, and the bridging of distant domains - together with a further, cross-cutting distinction between meaning pursued because a pattern was observed and meaning pursued because it is strategically wanted, a distinction I develop through the case of conjecture-formation. These mechanisms are likely non-substitutable, so that competence in one does not transfer to the others. Grounding each in a historical case study and in an architecture-level account of current transformer-based systems, I suggest that today's models concentrate their competence in modes shaped by recombination and search over existing building blocks; if that description holds, the remaining modes are out of reach in principle, not just slower - though whether it holds is itself the open, empirical part. Because proof is getting cheaper as AI improves at generating it - a shift the field's own leading voices are now diagnosing - mathematical value is migrating toward the modes current systems cannot yet perform, and evaluations of AI mathematical ability should be organized around this taxonomy rather than around aggregate benchmarks that conflate it.