arXiv:2608.23867cs.MAcs.CL2026-08

用市场机制替代中心化调度,让大模型代理自主竞价协作。

Markets, Not Planners: Decentralized Orchestration of LLM Agents with Private Information

论文配图:Markets, Not Planners: Decentralized Orchestration of LLM Agents with Private Information
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 代理通过私有成本和策略笔记参与竞标,分配器依据报价与声誉选优。
  • 在多类任务中匹配代理专长,成本敏感时自动转向低价代理,性能优于主流方法。
  • 适合构建去中心化智能体系统的研究者与开发者,尤其关注效率与抗操纵性。

随着大模型代理由不同主体构建并具备各异能力与成本,其协同更像经济中的劳动力调配而非程序调用。现有方案多为集中式规划,存在瓶颈、需隐私信息且易受操控——单一偏好插入可使被偏爱代理的任务占比几乎翻倍。我们提出AgentLance,一个重复的劳动力市场:代理基于私有成本和自维护策略笔记竞标任务,分配器根据报价与公开声誉记录选择胜者,并采用类似VCG的支付机制激励真实成本报价。复杂任务通过层级委托处理:胜出代理可分解工作并以相同机制外包。在数学推理、代码生成、知识密集型问答及代理任务中,AgentLance有效匹配代理专长,随成本敏感度提升自动转向低成本代理,持续优于单模型、集中式调度及市场基线。诊断市场失灵(如成本误估、次优出价)并通过可控实验纠正后进一步提升性能,为构建更高效的智能体经济提供可行路径。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

As LLM agents proliferate, built by different parties and with different capabilities and costs, orchestrating them is more like assembling labor across the economy than a computer calling a subroutine. Existing orchestration is typically centralized, with a single planner assigning every task, but this creates a bottleneck as agent pools grow, requires private information (e.g., agents' execution costs), and can easily be manipulated, such that a single inserted preference nearly doubles a favored agent's task share under a centralized LLM allocator. We introduce AgentLance, a repeated labor market in which agents bid on tasks using their private costs and self-maintained strategy notes, an allocator selects winners from bids and public reputation records, and a VCG-style payment rule rewards cost-aware bidding. Complex tasks are handled by hierarchical delegation: winning agents can decompose work and subcontract it through the same mechanism. Across mathematical reasoning, code generation, knowledge-intensive QA, and agentic tasks, AgentLance matches agents to their specializations, shifts work toward cheaper agents as cost sensitivity rises, and consistently outperforms single-model, centralized-orchestration, and market baselines. Diagnosing market failures, including inaccurate cost self-estimation and sub-optimal bidding, then correcting them in controlled experiments yields further gains, charting a path toward more efficient agent economies.

智能体协作去中心化市场机制成本优化

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