用自洽反馈机制让大模型拒绝迎合用户，提升回答真实性。

Large language models (LLMs) frequently exhibit \emph{sycophancy}: they adapt their answers to a user's stated beliefs or preferences instead of reporting what they hold to be true, which lowers factual accuracy and can amplify misinformation. This paper proposes a methodology for mitigating sycophancy that employs the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS), a peer-prediction mechanism, as the reward in Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to fine-tune an LLM. BTS pays an answer for being \emph{surprisingly common}, that is, more frequent among respondents than those respondents themselves predicted. We treat a group of responses from a model for one question as those respondents, so the reward is a function of the model's own outputs and fine-tuning needs neither labels nor preference annotations. We prove that in the large-group limit a sycophantic response earns strictly lower expected reward than an honest one. We also prove that if the entire group agrees in advance on a symmetric answering rule, it cannot earn a higher information score than under truthful reporting. On our true/false benchmark the reference model's answer-flip rate under user pressure decreases from 23% to 4%, and its accuracy under that pressure increases from 80% to 93%. Our reward outperforms SMART and is comparable to synthetic-data fine-tuning and to pinpoint tuning, all three of which train on labels. It spends considerably more compute in exchange, which makes it suitable when labeled data is scarce. Peer Truth Serum, which also pays a premium for a rare answer but elicits no prediction report, reproduces the effect. A peer-prediction reward computed inside a single GRPO group therefore reduces sycophancy without labels, and comparing mechanisms suggests that the premium paid for a rarer answer drives the effect.