arXiv:2609.03139cs.CVcs.CR2026-09

不依赖模型内部信息,实时检测并清除图像中的后门触发器。

Beyond Small Patches: Black-Box Detection and Purification of Diverse Backdoor Triggers

论文配图:Beyond Small Patches: Black-Box Detection and Purification of Diverse Backdoor Triggers
图 1 · 摘自论文原文
  • 通过深度特征分割识别异常图像区域,定位潜在后门触发器。
  • 在无需预设触发器形状或位置的情况下,实现98.84%以上的攻击成功率抑制。
  • 支持实际部署,缓存已识别触发器特征以提升效率,适合防御资源受限场景。

深度神经网络在现实视觉系统中广泛应用,但其预测可能被后门攻击篡改:恶意触发器导致特定误分类,同时保持高干净准确率。现有防御方法通常依赖模型内部结构、训练数据或干净验证样本,难以在仅有黑盒访问权限时部署。本文提出TRIM(Trigger Removal by Identifying Manipulated Regions),一种面向部署的黑盒防御机制,在推理阶段检测并选择性清除后门触发器,无需模型内部信息、训练数据或干净样本。其核心思想是识别引发异常行为的图像区域,并仅净化这些区域而保留正常内容。TRIM创新性地结合三项技术:(i) 基于深度特征表示的区域分割;(ii) 通过修复与扩散重建自适应发现触发区域,无需假设触发器类型、形状或位置;(iii) 选择性区域净化,清除污染区域同时保留良性内容。为支持实际部署,TRIM还缓存先前识别的触发器特征嵌入,实现高效识别,避免重复检测与净化。在多种数据集和后门类型(包括混合型、稀疏型、不同尺寸、多重触发器)上的大量实验表明,TRIM显著优于现有黑盒防御方法,将攻击成功率(ASR)降至最低1.16%,同时保持最高87.87%的干净准确率。结果证明,即使无任何辅助数据,推理阶段的有效后门缓解依然可行。

原文摘要 · Abstract (English)

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly deployed in real-world vision systems, yet their predictions can be covertly manipulated by backdoor attacks, in which malicious triggers cause targeted misclassification while preserving high clean accuracy. Existing defenses often rely on model internals, training data, or clean validation samples, making them difficult to deploy when only black-box access to a trained model is available. We propose TRIM (Trigger Removal by Identifying Manipulated Regions), a deployment-oriented black-box defense that detects and selectively removes backdoor triggers at inference time without requiring model internals, training data, or clean samples. The key insight behind TRIM is to identify image regions that are responsible for anomalous model behavior and purify only those regions while preserving benign content. TRIM innovates via three key components: (i) region-based segmentation with deep feature representations, (ii) adaptive trigger discovery through inpainting and diffusion-based reconstruction to isolate regions responsible for misclassification---without assumptions about trigger type, shape, or location, and (iii) selective region purification that cleans poisoned regions while retaining benign content. To support practical deployment, TRIM further caches feature embeddings of previously identified triggers, enabling efficient recognition and avoiding redundant detection and purification. Extensive experiments across diverse datasets and backdoor types, including blended, sparse, varying-size, and multiple triggers, show that TRIM consistently outperforms existing black-box defenses, reducing attack success rates (ASR) to as low as 1.16% while preserving clean accuracy of up to 87.87%. These results demonstrate that effective backdoor mitigation is possible at inference time even when the defender has no access to any auxiliary data.

后门攻击黑盒防御图像净化推理安全

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