揭示大模型如何整合外部证据，发现其决策受自身偏好影响

Despite increasing reliance on LLMs that reason with external evidence supplied by tools, retrieval-augmented generation, other agents, and users, how LLMs integrate such evidence into decisions they have already begun to form remains largely unclear. We present a distributional theory in which evidence shifts the receiver's distribution of initial answers, driven by a receiver prior weight and a candidate evidence tilt, leading to three predictions. First, candidates more probable to the receiver are more persuasive. Second, receivers more readily integrate characteristic errors of their own than foreign errors from different sources. Third, identical evidence can improve weaker models and harm stronger ones. We confirm these over ten million trials, twelve LLMs from four families, and eight domains, four of them scientific discovery tasks in the physical and life sciences: quantum mechanics, physics, genetics, and molecular biology. The law also yields a receiver-relative reliability frontier: receiver-congruent errors depress performance more steeply than random errors of the same rate. LLMs also integrate candidates even after internally verifying their invalidity (93-100% with propositional constraints; up to 99.4% on held-out physical and life-sciences reasoning), demonstrating evidence integration is a receiver-specific control policy over existing distributions, determined by receiver properties rather than scalar trust in the evidence source. Causal interventions show candidate integration is implemented late in the network, as a structured sequence of steps admitting external candidate answers, promoting them, and transporting them into the answer state. Representations of verification are decodable but have little causal impact on answers. A J-lens decomposition shows the state underlying verbalized verification is fully dissociable from that underlying candidate integration.