用输出分歧动态调噪,实现生成式模型的隐私保护。
PAC-Private Autoregressive Generation: Calibrating Noise to Ensemble Disagreement
- 基于多世界投票机制,根据预测一致性动态调整噪声
- 在WikiText-103上保留74%微调收益,成员推断成功率低于51.08%
- 适合关注生成内容隐私且需长期稳定输出的研究者
语言模型在私有文本上微调后通过API服务,隐私泄露主要来自生成输出而非权重暴露。私有预测可保护输出安全。现有方法如PMixED在每次生成时产生隐私成本,并随生成长度增加依赖公共模型。相比之下,PAC隐私通过校准噪声以匹配不同秘密下的输出变异性,在预测稳定时加噪更少。本文首次将PAC隐私扩展至自回归生成任务:从私有语料构建128个重叠世界,每条记录出现在64个世界中,冻结公共模型并为每个世界训练独立适配器,真实世界为秘密。每个词元生成时,公共模型定义候选集,各世界投票,其后验加权分歧决定PAC噪声;完全一致则无需加噪。证明了信息泄漏上限为 $I(S;Y_{1:T}) \ leq I(S;H_T) \ leq bT$。贡献包括:将PAC隐私推广至自回归生成、处理自适应上下文生成、引入耦合解码避免贪婪退化。在WikiText-103与GPT-2-small上,每词元预算为 $2^{-32}$ 时,保留74%微调收益;生成10^6个词元后,成员推断成功率被限制在51.08%以下;泄漏估计值约为所计预算的17%。推理隐私不等于内容保护:即使对记忆性信标成员推断优势接近零,信标仍以相同速率生成。相比在同数据集上匹配成员推断边界下的PMixED,本方法在 $10^2$ 到 $10^6$ 词元范围内保持98%非私有余量,而后者最多仅56%,且无交叉点。
原文摘要 · Abstract (English)
Language models adapted on private text are often served through APIs, so privacy leakage occurs through generated outputs rather than exposed weights. Private prediction protects these releases. Methods such as PMixED incur privacy cost at each release and increasingly rely on the public model over long horizons. PAC privacy instead calibrates noise to output variability across possible secrets, adding less noise when predictions are stable. To our knowledge, PAC-private prediction has not previously been extended from classification to autoregressive generation. We construct $m=128$ overlapping worlds from the private corpus, with each record appearing in exactly $m/2$ worlds, and train one adapter per world over a frozen public model. The realized world is the secret. At each token, the public model defines a candidate set, the worlds vote, and their posterior-weighted disagreement determines the PAC noise; unanimity requires no calibration noise. We prove $I(S;Y_{1:T}) \leq I(S;H_T) \leq bT$. Our contributions are extending PAC privacy to autoregressive generation, handling adaptive self-generated contexts, and introducing coupled decoding that preserves privacy accounting while avoiding greedy degeneration. On WikiText-103 with GPT-2-small, we retain 74% of the fine-tuning gain at a per-token budget of $2^{-32}$, while membership-inference success is bounded by 51.08% after $10^6$ tokens; posterior-entropy estimates of leakage are roughly 17% of the charged budget. Inference privacy is not content protection: even when membership advantage on a memorized canary is indistinguishable from zero, the canary is emitted at the same rate. Against PMixED under matched membership-inference bounds on the same data universe and test set, we retain 98% of non-private headroom from $10^2$ to $10^6$ tokens, versus at most 56%, with no crossover.
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